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Summary  
This thesis consists of three papers analysing advertising in markets with consumption 
externalities. These markets, where the value of the product to the consumer increases as the 
number of other consumers purchasing the product increases, are growing due to network 
effects, connectivity and the improved ease of social interaction. Strategic advertising and 
pricing play important roles in such markets. These observations serve as a starting point for 
this thesis.    
“Entry Deterrence, Coordinating Advertising and Pricing in Markets with Consumption 
Externalities” explores an incumbent’s ability to use coordination advertising in a market with 
consumption externalities to deter future entry from a challenger with an equal quality 
product. I show that strategic entry deterrence is possible and involves strategic pre-
commitment to over-investment. The findings suggest that an incumbent’s ability to deter 
entry is sensitive to the size of the fixed cost of entry that the challenger must incur and the 
consumption externality parameter.  
“Variation of Advertising to Sales Ratios and Entry Deterrence Behaviour: Evidence from 
UK Survey Data” uses Advertising and Industry Survey (AIS) data from over 800 UK firms 
to investigate the relationship between the firms’ advertising to sales ratios and entry 
deterrence behaviour. Due to the construction of this dataset, it was not possible to focus on 
firms producing products with consumption externalities only. The behaviour of all firms are 
considered. Depending on what type of oligopoly is used, theoretical results either suggest 
over- or under-investment in advertising to deter entry. I find that if a firm perceives 
advertising expenditure as an important strategy to deter entry it will increase, rather than 
decrease, its advertising expenditure.  
“System Wars: The Power of Network Externalities” introduces network externalities and 
persuasive advertising into a Hotelling framework to investigate two firms, producing 
different varieties of a good, competing in a market with asymmetric network intensities. In 
spite of different network intensities, I show that both firms can exist simultaneously in the 
market. The firm with the stronger network externality dominates. This provides a new 
example of a “Matthew Effect” where the initial advantage is self-amplifying. In equilibrium, 
this dominant firm, when compared to the firm with the lower network intensity, will have 
higher advertising expenditure, price, market share and profits. 
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1. Entry Deterrence, Coordinating Advertising    
and Pricing in Markets with Consumption 
Externalities 
                                                                                       
 
Abstract 
 
This paper extends the entry deterrence literature by examining coordinating 
advertising in markets with consumption externalities using a stochastic success 
function. Optimal advertising and pricing strategies are analysed when an incumbent 
firm faces a challenger with a product of equal quality. I show that strategic entry 
deterrence using advertising is possible and optimal entry deterrence involves strategic 
pre-commitment to over-investment relative to the non-strategic simultaneous 
advertising benchmark. I show that when entry deterrence is not possible the 
incumbent does not possess a first mover advantage and optimal entry accommodation 
involves strategic investment in advertising followed by aggressive price competition 
congruent with the non-strategic simultaneous advertising benchmark. The findings 
suggest that an incumbent’s ability to deter entry through coordinating advertising in a 
market with products of equal quality is sensitive to the size of the fixed cost of entry 
that the challenger must incur and the consumption externality parameter.  
 
Keywords 
Limit Advertising, Coordinating Advertising, Consumption Externality,  
Entry Deterrence 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION   
The incumbent firm can have a significant advantage over an aspiring entrant to the 
market through a first mover advantage and the opportunity to erect barriers to entry. 
Entry deterrence with advertising has been extensively studied since Spence (1980). 
Spence examined the persuasive role of advertising where advertising changes 
individual’s preferences leading to a demand shift in favour of the good being 
advertised.
1
 However, like many of the first examinations of barriers to entry in the 
early limit-pricing literature, he employs the game-theoretically unsound assumption 
that the incumbent must maintain output and advertising levels at the pre-entry levels. 
In this view of advertising, a large advertising expenditure can imply an aggressive 
setting for a potential entrant and may deter entry.  
Schmalensee (1983), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Ishigaki (2000), Krahmer (2006), 
and Doraszelski and Marovich (2007) examine the role of advertising in entry 
deterrence where advertising builds goodwill, making it harder for an entrant to attract 
the attention of the consumer.
2
  
Schmalensee (1983) was the first to examine entry deterrence using advertising 
expenditure in a subgame perfect equilibrium. He considers entry deterrence in a 
market for homogenous products served by an incumbent faced by a potential entrant. 
This is a three-stage model where the incumbent advertises in the first stage, in the 
second stage the challenger observes the incumbent’s advertising and chooses 
whether to enter. If the challenger decides to enter the market, he incurs a sunk cost 
                                                 
1
 The persuasive view can be traced back to Braithwaite (1928), Kaldor (1950), Galbraith (1958, 1967), 
Bain (1956), Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974), Solow (1967), Dixit and Norman (1978) and Becker 
and Murphy (1993). 
2
 See Ozga (1960) and Stigler (1961).  See also Telser (1964), Nelson (1970, 1974), Butters (1977), 
Schmalensee (1978), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984), Milgrom and 
Roberts (1986), Stegeman (1991), Meurer and Stahl (1994), Robert and Stahl (1993), Stahl (1994) and 
Bagwell and Ramey (1994) for the informative view. 
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and makes his advertising investment. The advertising technology used is as Butters 
(1977) proposed, where consumers receive an advert from the incumbent which 
informs them of the company’s existence and price of the product at zero cost. This 
message is durable and consumers remember the incumbent in the second stage of the 
game.
3
 In the final stage, the firms simultaneously decide on quantities. Schmalensee 
(1983) finds that entry deterrence is possible and involves investing less in advertising 
than when there was no threat of entry. The reasoning is that if the incumbent were to 
launch a large advertising campaign it would have a large potential consumer base. In 
this case, a low output combined with a high price would be appealing to them. A 
rational entrant would prefer to enter the market under these circumstances. 
Therefore, the incumbent reduces its advertising expenditure so that it may respond to 
entry aggressively.  
Sutton (1991) examines an oligopoly market structure model to show that an increase 
in the market size does not lead to a fragmented market structure when firms 
endogenously incur sunk costs through advertising expenditure. Therefore, increases 
in the density of consumers does not induce entry or exit to the market but additional 
profits are absorbed by higher advertising expenditure by firms. Sutton (1991) 
assumes that advertising expenditures by incumbents creates a barrier to entry, 
whereas, Schmalensee (1983) assumes that brand awareness creates the barrier to 
entry.  
Ishigaki (2000) extends Schmalensee (1983) to examine entry deterrence in a market 
for homogenous products where post-entry competition is in prices. He finds that the 
incumbent is unable to deter entry by strategically committing to advertising 
                                                 
3
 This type of advertising technology is characteristic of the goodwill role of advertising. 
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investment. The simultaneous-move price-setting game in the post-advertising stage is 
solved as a unique mixed-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium where the firm with the 
higher advertising tends to set high prices more often and earns higher profits than the 
firm with lower advertising expenditure. The research of Schmalensee (1983) and 
Ishigaki (2000) suggest that the goodwill effect of advertising in the homogenous-
product market is sensitive to whether firms compete in prices and quantities after 
making their advertising decisions. However, neither paper suggests that an 
incumbent can deter entry in a market with homogenous products by increasing their 
advertising expenditure above the non-strategic simultaneous advertising benchmark.  
Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1984) seminal paper considers a two-stage model where the 
incumbent and the potential entrant compete with differentiated products. Similar to 
the advertising technology in Butters (1977), the incumbent chooses the proportion of 
consumers to inform of its existence and prices in the first stage, while charging the 
monopoly price. In the second stage, the incumbent and entrant make advertising and 
pricing decisions. The goodwill effect is intensified with the assumption that the 
consumers who receive an advert in the first stage remain consumers of the incumbent 
only for the duration of the game as they do not read any advert they receive in the 
second stage. Firms are assumed to advertise to cover the remaining market. Their 
findings include conditions where the incumbent over-invests to accommodate the 
entrant, referred to as becoming a “fat cat”. However, when it is optimal to deter 
entry, the incumbent under-invests, referred to as the “lean-and-hungry look”. It is 
most advantageous for the firm to create a small group of consumers for its product 
and constrain itself to a low price given the threat of entry.  
13 
 
Krahmer (2006) also extends Schmalensee (1983) to examine advertising and 
conspicuous consumption where brand recognition is of importance and consumers 
care about their image. This paper shows that an incumbent may strategically over-
invest in advertising to deter entry. Doraszelski and Marovich (2007) propose a 
dynamic model with goodwill advertising in a market for differentiated goods. They 
solve numerically for the symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium and find that an 
incumbent can deter entry with over-investment in advertising and generally 
accommodates entry by under-investment in advertising, although the optimal 
accommodation strategy varies with market features. 
Entry deterrence has also been examined when it plays an informative role through 
signalling the incumbent’s private information through its pre-entry behaviour. 
Bagwell and Ramey (1988) followed by Bagwell (2007) extend Milgrom and Roberts 
(1982) to show that price and advertising may be used to signal cost to the potential 
entrant. The results of this paper state that an incumbent can over-invest in advertising 
to deter entry and limit pricing can be expected to occur even when firms have the 
option to use advertising to signal costs. Linnemer (1998) has price and advertising 
jointly signalling costs and quality. This paper also shows that positive dissipative 
advertising, a large advertising campaign that does not directly affect demand, may be 
used along with a distorted price to signal type.  
In this paper, I assume that consumers and firms are fully informed of the product’s 
existence, characteristics, prices and production costs but a role for advertising still 
exists as a tool for entry deterrence due to positive consumption externalities in the 
market. Positive consumption externalities arise in markets where the utility that a 
consumer derives from the consumption of a product increases with the number of 
14 
 
other consumers purchasing the same product either due to network or social 
interaction effects. For example, the decision about which computer software to 
purchase involves expectations about which package will be more heavily purchased 
in addition to the relative prices and qualities of the rival firms’ packages. Decisions 
about which phone company to connect with, smartphone or internet gaming console 
to purchase, movie to watch, book to read, credit card to use, internet share network to 
join, are all likely to involve expectations about how many people will be using the 
same brand or network. 
Chwe (2001), Clark and Horstmann (2005), Pastine and Pastine (2002, 2011), and 
Sahuguet (2011) show that in markets with consumption externalities firms may 
engage in advertising competition in order to coordinate consumer expectations on 
their own brand.
4
 In a market with positive consumption externalities a consumer 
faced with two competing brands makes his purchase decision based on his 
expectations about which brand will be the popular one. Firms have an incentive to 
present consumers with a coordinating device to coordinate the consumers’ 
expectations on their own product, even at a high cost to the firm. All else equal, due 
to the consumption externality, the consumer wishes to purchase the brand that is 
purchased by a greater proportion of the market. On viewing a large advertising 
campaign a consumer can rationalise that the firm would not have spent such a large 
amount on advertising if it did not expect the advertising to increase sales of its 
product. In this framework, this rationalization leads the consumer to purchase the 
                                                 
4
 Sahuguet (2011) shows coordinating advertising holds in a repeat advertising framework. Pastine and 
Pastine (2011) show that in vertically differentiated product markets advertising may be used as a 
coordinating device by firms. Clark and Horstmann (2005) show that the coordination role of 
advertising also survives in markets with horizontally differentiated products when advertising levels 
are imperfectly observable. 
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more heavily advertised brand, therefore, justifying the firm’s expenditure on 
advertising.  
This paper extends previous studies on coordinating advertising to analyse optimal 
advertising strategies in an entry deterrence framework where the monopolist 
incumbent has the first move and faces a challenger with a product of equal quality. 
This paper formalises the intuition that an incumbent monopolist firm may make it 
difficult for a would-be entrant by making a significant investment in advertising to 
coordinate consumers’ expectations on its product. If the potential entrant has to incur 
similar costs it may be deterred from entering the market. This is the first examination 
of entry deterrence when advertising is used as a coordination device. Furthermore, 
previous studies on coordinating advertising to date have abstracted from the 
interaction between advertising and retail price competition, therefore, assuming that 
the prices of firms were exogenous. This paper addresses the coordinating role of 
advertising in markets with consumption externalities by investigating optimal 
advertising and pricing strategies.  
The model extends existing coordination models of advertising in one other 
significant way. In Pastine and Pastine (2011) coordinating advertising takes the form 
of an all-pay auction and consumers purchase from the firm with the largest 
advertising expenditure. Therefore, in this set-up, if one firm advertises €1 more, 
consumers coordinate on its product. In this paper, a probabilistic outcome has been 
introduced using a stochastic success function based on a lottery type all pay-auction 
as devised by Tullock (1980). Each firm’s probability of capturing the coordinated 
demand is proportional to the firm’s share of the total expenditure on advertising. As 
a result, the more money spent on advertising the greater the probability of managing 
16 
 
to coordinate the consumers on its product. This aspect makes the model more 
realistic and could capture an aspect of an advertising campaign such as the chosen 
music or celebrity used leading to a particularly successful or unsuccessful campaign.  
Paton (2008) provides empirical support for the hypothesis that firms do in fact use 
advertising to deter entry. Nearly one-quarter of 843 medium-sized and large UK-
based firms surveyed about their advertising practices cite entry deterrence as an aim 
of their advertising. Furthermore, one in five managers of firms that advertise stated 
that they would increase advertising expenditure if a new rival company appeared in 
their market. Paton (2008, p.78) suggests “[s]pecifically, firms in services, producer 
manufacturing and those operating in highly monopolised markets appear to be much 
more likely to respond aggressively than others”. These findings support the case that 
an incumbent monopoly firm is likely to respond to potential entry by aggressively 
increasing its advertising. 
This paper shows that the size of the fixed set up cost is a key determinant of the 
industry structure. When advertising has a coordinating role and the fixed cost of set-
up is high the incumbent can deter the challenger from entering with his advertising 
expenditure. A monopolist that does not face a potential entrant in my model would 
not advertise. Faced with a potential entrant, I show that the monopolist is induced to 
advertise for a range of values of the non-recoverable set-up cost (Ω), either to 
accommodate or deter entry. Entry deterrence involves strategic pre-commitment to 
over-investment relative to the non-strategic simultaneous advertising benchmark. 
Therefore, the strategic entry deterrence is accomplished through over-investing in 
advertising. This is in contrast to the findings of Schmalensee (1983), Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1984), and Ishigaki (2000) where the threat of entry induces the incumbent 
17 
 
monopolist to advertise less than he would if entry were not possible. However, the 
model bears some resemblance to the more recent findings of Krahmer (2006), 
Bagwell (2007), and Doraszelski and Marovich (2007) that point to some cases where 
the incumbent monopolist may over-invest in advertising.  
Furthermore, I show that when entry deterrence is not possible the incumbent does not 
possess a first mover advantage. Optimal entry accommodation involves a strategic 
investment in advertising followed by aggressive price competition congruent with 
the non-strategic simultaneous advertising benchmark. Such a result has not been seen 
in the literature before and stems from the introduction of the stochastic success 
function allowing a probabilistic outcome from the advertising expenditure.  
The result of this paper can be interpreted as the advertising expenditure by the 
incumbent increasing the cost of entry and therefore leading to entry deterrence. In 
this view, the model bears some resemblance to the role of investment in entry 
deterrence (Spence (1977), Dixit (1980)). Similarly to Dixit (1980) and Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1984) this paper finds that in some cases, the incumbent would have to 
advertise on such a large scale in order to deter entry that it may not be profitable, in 
which case it is more profitable to accommodate entry. The main results are driven by 
the coordinating role of advertising, the consumption externality and how it affects 
firms’ advertising incentives. The coordination device does not rely on commercial 
signaling or providing any information about the product itself; all that is necessary is 
for a person to know that other people are seeing the advertisements also. An 
illustrative anecdote is Windows95 introduction to the market. The competing similar 
operating system was OS2. Microsoft succeeded to coordinate consumers’ 
expectations on Windows95. Its advertising campaign spending alone cost US$300 
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million and Microsoft chose to clearly state its expenditure on advertising on 
billboards during its advertising campaign. Microsoft told each viewer that many 
others also knew about Windows95. This paper tries to move from anecdote and 
evidence to theory.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 1.2, I develop the model 
framework. The equilibrium is developed in Section 1.3 where I discuss pricing and 
advertising decisions. Section 1.4 concludes. 
1.2 MODEL 
The incumbent firm is challenged by a new entrant in a market with products of equal 
quality. The challenger must incur a sunk cost     in order to enter the market. Each 
profit maximizing firm has the same constant marginal production costs, normalised 
to zero. I consider a sequential game where the incumbent makes its irreversible 
advertising decision      in the first stage. In the second stage, the potential entrant 
observes the incumbent’s advertising and chooses whether to enter the market. If the 
challenger chooses to enter the market it determines its advertising level     . In the 
third stage, firms compete in prices. Consumers make their purchasing decisions 
simultaneously after observing the firms’ advertising and pricing decisions. 
Communication between consumers is not considered in this model. 
1.2.1 Consumers 
Consumer preferences exhibit positive consumption externalities. The utility the 
consumer gets from the product is a function of the quality of the product     and it is 
increasing in the number of people     who purchase the same brand. Consumers 
want, at most, one unit from each brand. Following Pastine and Pastine (2011), there 
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is a continuum of consumers who differ in their taste     for the product where   is 
uniformly distributed between 0 and   . This represents a mass of consumers who are 
differentiated by their taste for this product where 0 is the consumer with lowest taste 
and    is the consumer with the highest taste for the product,          .  
Consumer i’s indirect utility is given by: 
       0                if he makes no purchase 
                                     if he buys only product j      (1) 
                      +                       if he buys product j and then product k 
 
for      {Incumbent, Challenger} and    ,    ,         .   is the 
consumption externality parameter and it is multiplied by the proportion of people     
who purchase the same brand. The intrinsic value     is assumed to be symmetric 
across the two brands. Since      ,   reflects the fact that the utility function 
exhibits diminishing marginal utility. This utility function implies that consumers 
have at most a unit demand for each product. Depending on the prices and qualities of 
the products consumers with a high enough taste for the product may purchase both of 
the products. However no individual purchases two of the same item. For example, 
we can understand this to be true for products with consumption externalities such as 
computer software, smartphones, phone service provider, online gaming consoles, etc. 
Due to the consumption externality, all else equal, consumers wish to purchase the 
brand that is purchased by a greater proportion of the market. In this framework, the 
rationalization that a firm would not have spent such a large amount on advertising if 
it did not expect the advertising to increase sales of its product leads the consumer to 
20 
 
use advertising as a coordination device and purchase the more heavily advertised 
brand.  
1.2.2 Advertising 
Firms can engage in advertising with multiple objectives, such as signalling an 
aggressive stance to the rival, providing information of the existence and price of the 
product, and persuading consumers that the product is desirable. In order to focus 
solely on the coordinating role of advertising, I abstract from all other roles of 
advertising. I assume that consumers are rational and that their preferences are 
constant, and that consumers and firms are fully informed of the product’s existence, 
characteristics and production costs. Therefore, the role of advertising does not rely 
on commercial signalling or informing anything about the product itself, the firms use 
advertising expenditure to convince consumers that their product will be the product 
that will be purchased by the larger number of consumers. 
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1.3 EQUILIBRIUM 
In this section, I show that strategic entry deterrence is possible, and optimal entry 
deterrence by the monopolist involves strategic pre-commitment to over-investment 
relative to the non-strategic simultaneous advertising benchmark. I show that when 
entry deterrence is not possible, the incumbent does not possess a first mover 
advantage. Optimal entry accommodation involves a strategic investment in 
advertising followed by aggressive price competition congruent with the non-strategic 
simultaneous advertising benchmark.  
Using backward induction, I begin by examining the firm’s optimal pricing decisions. 
Subsequently, I analyse the benchmark case where firms advertise simultaneously. 
This is followed by an analysis of the Stackelberg leadership model by examining the 
advertising reaction function of the challenger, and finally the optimal advertising 
strategy of the incumbent. 
1.3.1 Pricing Decisions 
In order to show firms optimal pricing decisions, first let me examine the consumer 
demand for both products. Consider the case where consumers, due to the relative 
advertising expenditures of firm j and k in the first stages, believe a higher proportion 
of people will purchase j’s product. All else equal, consumers will have a preference 
to buy firm j’s product as they expect to derive higher consumption externalities from 
this product as       and therefore                           for 
     . 
Firm demands are derived by looking for the indifferent consumers showing 
similarities to Hotelling’s (1929) model. Notice from figure 1.1 below that consumers 
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who purchase product k are the individuals who purchase both products. I define    
such that if    is low        ; consumers buy neither of the products. Define      
such that if    is high         ; consumers buy both products. The critical values of 
  and    are derived below. If    takes a value,  
        , these consumers buy 
one product and they choose the product which has captured the coordinated demand. 
                             
  None            One (j)          Two (j and k) 
                                                 
 
Following Pastine and Pastine (2011) consumers whose marginal benefit from the 
first purchase is higher than price buy j if, 
                                                                                     (2) 
which implies, 
    
      
 
.                 (3) 
Individuals with taste       buy product j. Using equation (3) I can solve for the 
proportion of people who buy j as: 
      
      
  
 .                                               (4) 
Solving equation (4) for    yields the demand for    when consumers expect firm j to 
coordinate demand as: 
 
   
     
    
                                                    (5) 
Fig 1.1: Firm j coordinates the demand for j, k   {Incumbent, Challenger} 
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Firm j’s profit when it coordinates demand is  ; given by      from (5), times the 
price     : 
                                   
         
    
                                              (6) 
Note that the demand for    from equation (5) is a function of the price of product j 
but not a function of the price of product k. The quantity as stated in equation (5) is 
equal to the quantity that the monopoly firm would have enjoyed as the point    
remains unchanged.  
A consumer purchases the second item k, along with the first item j, if the additional 
benefit from k is higher than the price,   
                                                                                (7) 
which implies, 
                                                        
   
      
   
.                                        (8) 
Individuals with taste     
   buy product k. Using equation (8) I can solve for the 
proportion of people who buy k as: 
               
      
   
                                              (9) 
Solving equation (9) for    yields the demand for    when consumers expect firm j to 
coordinate demand as: 
                        
      
     
                               (10) 
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Firm k’s profit with no coordinated demand is  ; given by    from (10), times the 
price     : 
      
          
     
                             (11) 
The firm which manages to coordinate the demand will be assumed to have a greater 
demand      . If j = Incumbent and k = Challenger, the incumbent firm has 
managed to coordinate the consumer demand on its product. Alternatively, if                
j = Challenger and k = Incumbent, the challenger has managed to coordinate the 
consumer demand on its product.  
On entering the pricing subgame, it is possible that the firms may have different levels 
of advertising. There exists an equilibrium where consumers coordinate on product j 
and an alternate equilibrium where consumers coordinate on product k. Firms have a 
preference over these equilibria and may try to distinguish themselves using 
advertising. Consumers believe that the firm with the higher level of advertising 
expenditure will have increased sales and be successful in coordinating the demand on 
its product.  
There are three possible positions on entering the pricing subgame: (1) consumers 
believe the incumbent will coordinate demand, (2) consumers believe the challenger 
will coordinate demand, and (3) consumers believe that the incumbent and challenger 
will share the market equally. Consumers will expect to gain higher utility from the 
good with higher expected sales which is the product from the firm who has managed 
to coordinate the demand. In case (3), if the consumers believe that both firms have 
the same level of advertising, all else equal, they believe that       as neither firm 
will manage to coordinate the demand and consumers who purchase one product will 
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split equally between the two products. Therefore, no firm manages to coordinate 
using advertising expenditure, consumers between the critical values of    and     are 
assumed to divide equally between product j and k, consumer          buy both 
products and      . 
Assuming that consumers expect firm j to coordinate, notice that the coordinated 
demand    in equation (5) only depends on the price of product j. Using equation (6) 
the coordinated profit of firm j can be differentiated with respect to    and set equal to 
zero yielding the optimal monopoly price for firm j as:
  
             
    
  
 
                            (12)
 
Solving equation (5) for    when firm j is charging the monopoly price      yields the 
optimal monopoly quantity as:  
                                                              
  
       
                          (13) 
Assuming that consumers expect firm j to coordinate, notice that the uncoordinated 
demand    in equation (9) also only depends on the price of product k. Using 
equation (11) the uncoordinated profit of firm k can be differentiated with respect to 
   and set equal to zero yielding the optimal monopoly price for firm k as:  
                        
    
   
  
                                      (14) 
Solving equation (10) for    when firm k is charging the monopoly price        yields 
the optimal monopoly quantity as:  
                                                             
   
        
                (15) 
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Equations (12) and (14) show that the monopoly price of j is greater than the price of 
k, since        . Notice that the monopoly prices are not a function of   , as a high 
value of the consumption externality parameter ( ) would mean that the quantity 
demanded is high. This would make the firm want to increase the price of its product. 
However, if   has a high value and the firm increases its price, the quantity demanded 
will decrease significantly. These two forces cancel each other out.  
In figure 1.2, the demand curves are used to illustrate monopoly prices and quantities. 
With further examination of monopoly quantity equations (13) and (15) and figure 
1.2, the monopoly pair of prices can be seen to be inconsistent with rational 
expectations that      , since        . If     and the monopoly prices are 
charged, firm k will have higher sales for its product due to the price of its product 
being significantly lower than firm j’s product.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
       
 
              
  
    
   
Fig 1.2: Demand for Firm j and k with monopoly prices and quantities 
 
  
 q 
1
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Notice that if firm k would be willing to charge    in order to break the initial 
expectations, it would no longer be optimal for firm j to charge    . Firm j would 
prefer to charge a lower price,       , offering a higher consumer surplus, 
coordinating consumers on its product, while still charging higher than    . If firm j 
decides that in the pricing stage it must fight for its popular position, the highest price 
it could charge as a function of    is solved, using      , as:  
                    
        
     
 
        
     
                                (17) 
Let    
 
 denote the maximum price that firm j can charge where firm k is indifferent 
between breaking the initial expectation with   
  and choosing to accept the unpopular 
demand and charging the monopoly price,    . Therefore,      
     
           .  
 
 
 
                                                     
 
 
   
                    
 
 
   
   
 
   
 
        
 
 jp
~
  
   
      A 
 
    
Fig 1.3: Demand for firm j and k showing   and    on same isoprofit curve,   . 
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In figure 1.3, an example of the intersection of    
  with the demand curve for product j 
can be seen at point A.
 
   
  may be greater or less than    depending on market 
conditions, but it will always be greater than   
 . Notice also from figure 1.3 that    
and   
  are positioned on the same isoprofit curve,   . Firm k will be indifferent 
between breaking the expectations and accepting the unpopular demand.    
  is a 
higher price than   
 
 and offers a greater profit to the firm who consumers expect to 
coordinate demand before the pricing stage. Once firm j charges a price slightly below 
   
  such as    
     , the optimal choice of firm k will be to accept the unpopular 
demand and charge   . 
In the final pricing stage, firms will compete in prices but it will not be necessary to 
undercut each other until the price equals marginal costs. Due to the consumption 
externality, both firms can earn positive profits. In equilibrium the firm who 
consumers expect to coordinate the demand after the advertising stage coordinates the 
demand by charging    
     and receives the highest profit denoted by  , while the 
firm who consumers expected to fail to coordinate the demand after the advertising 
stage captures the uncoordinated demand, charges the monopoly price for this demand 
   and receives the lower uncoordinated profit, denoted by  .  The Nash equilibrium 
in prices     
     
    
        
     
 
        
     
 
   
 
 
   are best responses to each other as 
it is optimal for the firm who consumers expect to coordinate the demand to defend its 
position through price competition in this stage. 
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1.3.2 Advertising Decisions 
The advertising technology in this model has a probabilistic outcome based on a 
lottery type all pay-auction as devised by Tullock (1980) with a scale parameter of 1. 
The firm’s probability of capturing the coordinated demand with the higher profit 
      is proportional to the firm’s share of the total expenditures on advertising.
5
 
                               
  
         
                                     (18)                    
Firm j wins the higher coordinated profit   with probability              and gets 
the lower uncoordinated profit of    with the probability               . 
Therefore, the expected profit of firm j is denoted by   , for j, k   {Incumbent, 
Challenger}. 
                             
  
     
          
  
     
                        (19) 
Let j = Incumbent and k = Challenger, then the expected profit to the incumbent firm 
is       as in equation (19). Let j = Challenger and k = Incumbent, then the expected 
profit to the challenging firm is       as in equation (19) but the challenger must also 
consider the fixed cost of set-up     on entering the market which enters negatively. 
1.3.2.1  Simultaneous Move Benchmark Case 
First examine the reaction functions of both firms to set-up a non-strategic benchmark 
case. Lemma 1 summarizes the main properties of the reaction functions: 
                                                 
5
 Henceforth, j, k   {Incumbent, Challenger}. For ease often only the incumbent’s result will be 
shown. The challenger’s result is given by changing the subscripts and taking into account the fixed set 
up cost. 
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Lemma 1: The reaction function        is strictly concave for         . The 
challenger has the following reaction function        for j, k   {Incumbent, 
Challenger} and    : 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
                               
 
  
                                                          
     
  
Proof.  
The       is given by the following equation: 
      
  
     
          
  
     
                     
       
(20) 
The first derivative of       with respect to    yields 
         
  
                
 
             
        (21) 
Therefore, the reaction function of the challenger,        is: 
                                
 
                            (22) 
The first derivative of         with respect to    for           yields   
                                           
        
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
      
 
    
    
                             (23) 
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Therefore,  
       
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                     
   
 
               
                                  
   
 
                        
                                        
   
 
        
        (24) 
 
The second derivative of the reaction function for            yields, 
                            
        
   
          
 
    
 
 
   .
                       
         (25) 
Thus, the reaction function        is strictly concave for          and crosses 
the 45° line as well as achieving its maximum at the point          
   
 
 
   
 
 . See 
point A on Figure 1.4.         
                                                                                                                      □ 
The reaction functions of both firms and the isoprofit curves of the incumbent are 
graphed below in Figure 1.4: 
 
 
                                               
` 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
   
 
 
    
   
  
   
 
   
      
 
 
 
    
Fig 1.4: Advertising Reaction Functions 
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This benchmark non-strategic case shows that in equilibrium both firms would have 
the following equal advertising rates: 
          
   
    
    
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
                                          (26) 
1.3.2.2  Sequential Move Advertising Case 
Using the reaction function of the challenger from equation (22), I now derive the 
equilibrium entry strategy of challenger. First, consider the case where the fixed cost 
is large enough to make it impossible for the challenger to enter and make a profit. If 
the fixed cost of set-up is greater than the expected profit for the challenger,   
     , the challenger will never enter the market. In this case, only the monopolist 
will be observed in the market, choosing not to advertise. Alternatively, if the fixed 
cost of set-up is less than the expected profit for the challenger,        , the 
challenger will always enter the market.   
The incumbent is the first mover in this game and can choose to either advertise a 
positive amount or not advertise at all. The challenger can either choose not to enter 
allowing the incumbent to earn the profit from capturing the coordinated demand    , 
or the challenger can choose to enter and advertise. If the incumbent had chosen not to 
advertise, an advertisement level of a small positive amount would allow the 
challenger to capture the coordinated demand, leaving the incumbent the profit from 
capturing the uncoordinated demand    . If the incumbent had chosen to advertise, 
the challenger would also choose to advertise in accordance with his reaction function 
from Lemma 1. By comparing the payoffs to the challenger, zero in the case of no 
entry and         in the case of entry, we can see that, if the expected profit to the 
33 
 
challenger is less than the fixed cost of entering, the challenger will always choose to 
stay out of the market.  
If the expected profit to the challenger is greater than the fixed cost of entering,
 
      , the challenger will enter and the two firms will be observed in the market. 
Note that the expected profits when both firms are advertising in the market is 
      
 
 
  
 
 
  and this term is always greater than  , since     . Therefore, we 
will never observe a new entrant in the market with zero advertising.  
Given the reaction function and the equilibrium entry strategy of the challenger, we 
can now solve the equilibrium strategy of the incumbent and the outcome of the 
game. If the challenger chooses to enter the market it determines its advertising level  
    . 
Proposition 1: The equilibrium advertising strategy    
    for firm i is described for 
all cases below: 
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Proof. 
 
To find the level of advertising necessary to deter the challenger from entering, the 
case when           needs to be evaluated further: 
        
  
     
          
  
     
                   (27) 
Using the challenger’s reaction function             
 
    , the problem 
simplifies to: 
                                 
 
                               (28) 
The deterrence level of advertising is therefore: 
  
            
 
       
 
  
 
          
                   (29)                         
Using this level of advertising the incumbent can deter the challenger from entering 
because with this level of advertising the challenger’s expected profit from entering 
the market and competing in advertising are equal to zero. From Lemma 1 the 
reaction function of the challenger is:  
                
 
                              (30) 
Knowing the reaction function of the challenger, the incumbent’s problem can now be 
solved. Fitting        back into the incumbent’s profit function yields 
                         
 
                 
           
           (31) 
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The first derivative of       with respect to    yields 
       
   
 
 
 
      
 
    
 
 
   
            
                          (32) 
The optimal level of advertising for the incumbent,    
 , in this case is: 
   
  
   
 
                                                       
 (33) 
Given the incumbent’s advertising level of    
 , the challenger’s optimal response is: 
   
  
   
 
                                    
                   (34) 
Therefore,    
    
    
   
 
 
   
 
 . See point A on Figure 4.       
                                                                                                                                 □ 
Result 1: The incumbent will choose an advertising level to deter entry if the fixed 
cost of entry is greater than the challenger’s expected operating profit and less than 
the profit from the coordinated demand     
 
 
  
 
 
 . In this case, the incumbent 
firm will advertise a positive amount   
            
 
       
 
  
 
, charge the 
monopoly price    
  
 
, coordinate the demand and the challenger will not enter the 
market. Moreover, if the fixed cost of entry is greater than the expected operating 
profit, entry is blocked, the incumbent firm will not advertise and the challenger will 
not enter the market. 
Result 1 shows that if     
 
 
  
 
 
  (a) the incumbent advertises more than 
when new entry is blocked (b) there is first mover advantage and (c) the incumbent 
earns less than when it is an unthreatened monopolist. The entry deterring incumbent 
receives the same amount of revenue as the unthreatened monopolist, as the same 
price and quantity demanded hold, but the increased advertising expenditure    
  
        reduces its overall profit. When the fixed cost of set-up is greater than the 
expected profit for the challenger, the strategic advertising expenditure by the 
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incumbent firm makes it unprofitable for the challenger to enter. The challenger will 
choose to stay out of the market and there will be no price competition. 
Result 2: The incumbent will choose an advertising level to accommodate entry if the 
fixed cost of entry is less than the challenger’s expected operating profit when both 
firms are in the market,   
 
 
  
 
 
 . In this case, both firms will advertise a positive 
amount   
   
   
 
  for         and because this case is symmetric they will both 
have a fifty per cent chance of coordinating the demand. Therefore, in this case the 
    
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
and     
   
  
     
    
      
  
     
          for         . 
Result 2 shows that if   
 
 
  
 
 
  (a) the incumbent advertises more than when 
     and new entry is blocked but it has the same advertising expenditure as the 
entrant, (b) there is no first mover advantage and (c) the incumbent earns less than 
when it is a monopolist. This proposition characterises the advertising equilibrium 
where the leader-follower framework results prove to be the same as the simultaneous 
benchmark case. This can be seen by comparing equation (26) with equations (33) 
and (34). When the fixed cost of set-up is less than the expected profit for the 
challenger, entry deterrence is not possible, the incumbent does not possess a first 
mover advantage and optimal entry accommodation involves a strategic investment in 
advertising congruent with the non-strategic simultaneous advertising benchmark 
followed by aggressive price competition. This result differs from related work by 
Dixit (1980) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).  The challenger will enter and both 
firms will compete in advertising and price with an equal probability of coordinating 
demand.  
Result 3: The incumbent’s advertising is higher under deterrence,                  
  
            
 
       
 
  
 
  than accommodation,   
    
   
 
  . 
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Proof.  
To evaluate the advertising expenditure of the incumbent across deterrence and 
accommodating strategies, let   
        
   : 
      
 
       
 
  
 
  
   
 
  
                        
                  
which simplifies to, 
 
           
          
   . 
                                   
                 
 
When   
 
 
  
 
 
 , the above inequality is strictly positive as . 
                                                                                                                                 □ 
Therefore, result 3 shows that the incumbent advertises more when advertising as a 
monopolist to deter entry than when accommodating and competing in a duopoly.  
 
1.4 DISCUSSION 
If the fixed cost of set-up outweighs the post-entry coordinated profit, entry is 
blockaded in the terminology of Bain (1956) and the challenger will not enter the 
market. This occurs when the fixed cost of entry is so high that the incumbent can act 
as an unthreatened monopolist. Thus, when    , only the incumbent is observed in 
the market with zero expenditure on advertising. When     
 
 
  
 
 
 , the 
challengers entry is deterred.  
In Bain’s classification, entry deterrence refers to cases where strategic behaviour by 
the monopolist deters entry. The incumbent actively raises a barrier to entry to prevent 
the potential competitor from entering the market. Notice that if the challenger enters 
the market and given that entry decision optimally sets its advertising level,        
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is non-positive. Thus, the incumbent sets   
     and the challenger will not enter the 
market. If   
 
 
  
 
 
 , entry is easy in Bain’s (1956) terminology. In this case, the 
incumbent would have to advertise on such a large scale in order to deter entry that it 
would not be profitable, in which case it is more profitable to accommodate entry. 
Thus, the challenger enters the market, both firms choose   
   
   
 
  with the same 
expected price. There is no first mover advantage for the incumbent and optimal entry 
accommodation involves a strategic investment in advertising congruent with the non-
strategic simultaneous advertising benchmark followed by aggressive price 
competition. It should also be noted that the difference between   and   is heavily 
based on the relative prices of the products and their sensitivity to the strength of the 
consumption externality.  
The above examination suggests that Doraszelski and Markovich (2007) are correct in 
suggesting that entry deterrence is best studied by comparing the incumbent’s 
advertising strategy in two scenarios: (a) when the set up cost is moderate so that 
entry is possible but not certain, and (b) when the set up cost is large enough to render 
entry impossible. I have shown that entry deterrence can occur if entry is possible but 
not certain, that is, entry takes place in some states but not in others.  
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1.5 CONCLUSIONS  
This paper extends the literature by examining entry deterrence via coordinating 
advertising in a market with consumption externalities. Optimal advertising strategies 
and pricing are analysed in an entry deterrence framework where the monopolist 
incumbent has the first move and faces a challenger with a product of equal quality. A 
probabilistic outcome has been introduced using a stochastic success function based 
on a lottery type all pay-auction as devised by Tullock (1980). I show that in a market 
with consumption externalities, even when availability, quality and production costs 
are common knowledge and the consumer preferences are constant in the face of 
advertising, firms may still advertise in order to coordinate consumer expectations on 
their own brand and to deter entry.  
Faced with a potential entrant, I show that the monopolist is induced to advertise for a 
range of values of the non-recoverable set-up cost    , either to accommodate or 
deter entry. Entry deterrence involves strategic pre-commitment to over-investment 
relative to the non-strategic simultaneous advertising benchmark. Therefore, the 
strategic entry deterrence is accomplished through over-investing in advertising. 
Furthermore, I show that when entry deterrence is not possible the incumbent does not 
possess a first mover advantage and optimal entry accommodation involves a strategic 
investment in advertising congruent with the non-strategic simultaneous advertising 
benchmark, followed by aggressive price competition. The findings suggest that an 
incumbent’s ability to deter entry through coordinating advertising is sensitive to the 
size of the fixed cost of set-up and the consumption externality parameter. 
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2. Variation of Advertising to Sales Ratios 
       and Entry Deterrence Behaviour:  
        Evidence from UK Survey Data                                                                              
 
 
Abstract 
 
The theoretical literature on advertising to deter entry either suggests over- or under-
investment in advertising, relative to the non-strategic benchmark, depending on what 
type of oligopoly is used. I analyse survey data from over 800 UK firms to examine 
the relationship between the advertising to sales ratio and entry deterrence behaviour. 
The results show that if a firm perceives expenditure on advertising as an important 
strategy to deter entry into the market it will increase, rather than decrease, its 
advertising intensity. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that firms 
strategically over-invest in advertising to deter entry.  
 
 
 
Keywords 
Advertising, Entry Deterrence 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Strategic entry deterrence refers to a decision made by an incumbent which affects a 
potential entrant’s expectations of the profitability of entry to the extent that it 
chooses to stay out of the market. Incumbent firms can have a significant advantage 
over potential entrants by using their position as first mover to erect barriers to entry 
and thereby benefit from a lower degree of competition. Such strategic decisions are 
important due to their anti-competitive nature and possible effects on welfare. Entry 
deterrence behaviour by an incumbent using strategic advertising decisions influences 
behaviour of a potential entrant without obvious signs of preventing entry. In fact, 
such strategic decisions will make entry unprofitable and makes antitrust investigation 
very difficult.  
Questionnaire studies offer insights into the importance of advertising in entry 
deterrence. Cubbin and Domberger (1988) used UK MEAL data to investigate actual 
responses of firms to prospective entry in their study of 42 advertising-intensive UK 
industries and find that 40 percent of their sample noticed a change in advertising 
behaviour of incumbents on entry. Smiley (1988) and Bunch and Smiley (1992) find 
that advertising is one of the most frequently used entry deterrence strategies with 
Smiley (1988) reporting that 32 percent of firms in his survey indicated that they used 
advertising to defend new markets. Their findings show that limit pricing and capacity 
expansion are less popular strategies to deter entry. Thirty four percent of the Singh et 
al. (1998) survey respondents gave a high priority to slowing down or dissuading the 
entry of new products into their markets and achieved this end by advertising. These 
figures highlight that advertising is an important strategic variable and firm managers 
use it to deter entry. The Advertising and Industry Survey (AIS) data used in this 
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paper show a slightly lower proportion compared to the above literature with 23 
percent of advertising managers attributing importance to entry deterrence as an aim 
of their advertising. 
The theoretical literature has extensively considered the differing roles of advertising 
and investigated the relationship between advertising and entry deterrence behaviour. 
However, the results are inconclusive as to whether a firm will strategically over- or 
under-invest in advertising, relative to the non-strategic benchmark, in order to deter 
entry. If it is optimal for a firm to strategically decrease (increase) its advertising 
expenditure below (above) its non-strategic level in order to deter entry into the 
market this is referred to as under-advertising (over-advertising). Therefore, facing the 
threat of entry, is it optimal for a firm to increase its advertising expenditure to 
establish a large potential consumer base when its preference in the absence of such a 
threat would be to maintain a low level of output combined with a high price, or 
alternatively, decrease its advertising expenditure to establish a small group of loyal 
consumers for its product and constrain itself to a low price?  
The strategic action of competing firms in post-entry competition must also be 
considered and the literature yields a number of general propositions. Quantity and 
price competition are usually referred to as strategic substitutes and strategic 
complements respectively. In the case of a symmetric firm competing with respect to 
quantities, if one firm were to increase its quantity of output, then the profit-
maximising response of the other firm would be to decrease its output. In this case, 
the quantity decisions are referred to as strategic substitutes. In contrast, the optimal 
responses of firms with post-entry price competition differ. If one firm changes its 
price the optimal response of the competing firm is to alter its price in the same 
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direction (up or down). The pricing decisions are referred to as strategic complements. 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) establish that the optimal advertising investment level is 
determined by two factors: whether post-entry competition is in strategic substitutes 
or strategic complements and whether the investment increases or decreases the 
incumbent’s marginal profitability. They conclude that if the investment in 
advertising increases the incumbent’s marginal profitability then the incumbent has an 
incentive to over-advertise (under-advertise) with strategic substitutes (strategic 
complements). On the other hand, if an investment in advertising decreases the 
incumbent’s marginal profitability, the incumbent has an incentive to under-advertise 
(over-advertise) with strategic substitutes (strategic complements). 
The lack of good quality advertising data and information on entry deterrence 
behaviour has restricted empirical research in this area. However, this unique 
Advertising and Industry Survey (AIS) dataset includes interesting variables in 
relation to firms’ advertising practices and advertising managers’ motivations for 
advertising. In this paper I analyse AIS survey data of more than 800 UK firms to 
examine the relationship between the advertising and entry deterrence behaviour. The 
main result of this paper shows that if a firm perceives expenditure on advertising as 
an important strategy to deter entry into the market it will increase its advertising 
intensity when threatened by a potential entrant. This result is in contrast to the 
theoretical findings of Schmalensee (1983), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), and 
Ishigaki (2000) where the threat of entry induces the incumbent monopolist to 
advertise less than it would if entry were not possible. However, the results support 
the theoretical findings of Krahmer (2006), Bagwell (2007), Doraszelski and 
Marovich (2007), and Whelan (2011) that point to entry deterrence cases where the 
incumbent monopolist over-invests in advertising. This result also supports Paton’s 
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(2008) empirical study which explores the determinants of the importance of entry 
deterrence to advertising managers and finds a strong correlation between the 
perceived importance of advertising as an entry deterrence tool and the intensity of 
advertising spending.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 gives a review the literature 
and section 2.3 outlines the data used. The results are shown in section 2.4 and section 
2.5 concludes. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW   
The use of advertising to deter entry has been extensively studied since Spence 
(1980). Spence examined the persuasive role of advertising where advertising changes 
individuals’ preferences leading to a demand shift in favour of the good being 
advertised. Schmalensee (1983), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Ishigaki (2000), 
Krahmer (2006), and Doraszelski and Marovich (2007) examine the role of 
advertising in entry deterrence where advertising builds goodwill, making it harder for 
an entrant to attract the attention of the consumer.  
Schmalensee (1983) finds that entry deterrence is possible and involves under-
advertising, investing less in advertising compared to the non-strategic benchmark 
case. In this model, suppose the incumbent were to launch a large advertising 
campaign.  This would generate a large potential consumer base. In this scenario, the 
incumbent firm would produce little and charge a high price. However, a rational 
entrant would choose to enter the market under these circumstances. Advertising 
would induce rather than deter entry. Therefore, the incumbent reduces its advertising 
expenditure so that it may respond to entry aggressively via its pricing policy.  
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Ishigaki (2000) extends Schmalensee (1983) to examine entry deterrence in a market 
for homogenous products where post-entry competition is in prices. He finds that the 
incumbent is unable to deter entry by strategically committing to advertising 
investment. Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1984) seminal paper considers a two-stage 
model where the incumbent and potential entrant compete with differentiated 
products. Their findings include conditions where the incumbent over-invests to 
accommodate the entrant, referred to as becoming a “fat cat”. However, when it is 
optimal to deter entry, the incumbent under-invests, referred to as the “lean-and-
hungry look”. In this set-up, it is most advantageous for the firm to create a small 
group of loyal consumers for its product and constrain itself to a low price in the 
threat of entry. Therefore, neither the research of Schmalensee (1983), Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1984) nor Ishigaki (2000) suggests that an incumbent can deter entry by over-
advertising.   
Krahmer (2006) also extends Schmalensee (1983) to examine advertising and 
conspicuous consumption where brand recognition is of importance and consumers 
care about their image. This paper shows that an incumbent may strategically over-
invest in advertising to deter entry. Doraszelski and Marovich (2007) propose a 
dynamic model with goodwill advertising in a market for differentiated goods. They 
solve numerically for the symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium and find that an 
incumbent can deter entry with over-investment in advertising and generally 
accommodates entry by under-investment in advertising, although the optimal 
accommodation strategy varies with market features. 
Entry deterrence has also been examined when it plays an informative role through 
signalling the incumbent’s private information through its pre-entry behaviour. 
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Bagwell and Ramey (1988) followed by Bagwell (2007) extend Milgrom and Roberts 
(1982) to show that price and advertising may be used to signal cost to the potential 
entrant. The results of this paper state that an incumbent will over-invest in 
advertising to deter entry. Linnemer (1998) has price and advertising jointly signalling 
cost of production and quality. This paper also shows that positive dissipative 
advertising, i.e. a large advertising campaign that does not directly affect demand, 
may be used to signal type.  
Chwe (2001), Clark and Horstmann (2005), Pastine and Pastine (2002, 2011), and 
Sahuguet (2011) show that in markets with consumption externalities firms may 
engage in advertising competition in order to coordinate consumer expectations on 
their own brand. Positive consumption externalities arise in markets where the utility 
that a consumer derives from the consumption of a product increases with the number 
of other consumers purchasing the same product either due to network or social 
interaction effects. The theoretical model in Whelan (2011) establishes that even 
when consumers and firms are fully informed of a product’s existence, characteristics, 
price and production cost a role for advertising still exists as a tool for entry 
deterrence in the presence of positive consumption externalities. Strategic entry 
deterrence is accomplished through over-investing in advertising relative to the non-
strategic benchmark. Whelan (2011) formalises the intuition that an incumbent firm 
may make it difficult for a would-be entrant by making a significant investment in 
advertising to coordinate consumers’ expectations on its product. If the potential 
entrant has to incur similar costs it may be deterred from entering the market. The 
main result is driven by the coordinating role of advertising, the consumption 
externality and how it affects firms’ advertising incentives.  
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Due to the lack of good quality data on firms’ advertising practices and entry 
deterrence behaviour, testing the above theories has proven difficult. Empirical work 
has attempted to link the observed levels of advertising or the regulatory structure to 
measures of market concentration and entry. Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992) suggest 
that US manufacturing industries with high advertising to sales ratios have lower 
entry rates; therefore, providing support that advertising could be a factor inhibiting 
entry. Sass and Saurman (1995) come to an opposing conclusion from their industry 
analysis of the malt beverage market. They report evidence that larger national 
brewers gain market share in states where retail price advertising is restricted. 
Comanor and Wilson (1979) and Hilke and Nelson (1984) argue that advertising can 
be used strategically by an incumbent to deter entry while Paton (2008) points to a 
strong correlation between the perceived importance of advertising as an entry 
deterring tool and the intensity of advertising spending.  
This paper investigates the relationship between advertising and entry deterrence 
behaviour to determine which strand of the theoretical literature best characterizes 
firm behaviour.  
2.3 THE DATA  
The 1999 Advertising and Industry Survey (AIS), obtained from the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC), is a unique dataset containing information on the 
advertising practices of 843 UK firms. For this survey, firms were selected from the 
Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. Questionnaires designed to obtain 
background information about the company, its advertising decisions and competitive 
environment were sent to firms’ advertising managers. The surveys were completed 
anonymously and ideally are reflective of advertising managers’ thoughts on their 
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strategic advertising behaviour. Full details of the survey process are documented in 
Conant and Paton (2001). They establish, via numerous tests for sample bias, that the 
respondents are a fair representation of the population of 5,234 firms sampled.  
A brief description of the variables used will be given below and summary statistics 
are provided Appendix Table 2.4.  
3.3.1 Advertising-Sales Ratio 
This paper attempts to examine the relationship between advertising intensity and 
strategic entry deterrence behaviour. Eighty-six percent of firms report that they 
engage in advertising and completed a question on their advertising to sales ratio. The 
advertising to sales ratio is one of the most commonly used measures of advertising 
intensity. It adjusts for sales volume to ensure that the scale factor does not dominate 
and intensity is properly measured. Also, budgeting advertising as a percentage of 
sales is a planning approach used by many firms. In the survey, firms are asked 
“During this financial year, how much will you spend on advertising as a percentage 
of your sales”. Managers were also given a second option to answer this same 
question in part (b) of the same question, “If you do not know the percentage, within 
which range does it lie? 0-0.5%, 0.5-1%, 1-2%, 2-3%, 3-4%, 4-5%, 5-6%, 6-8%, 8-
10%, 10+%”.  
Information from this question is used as the dependent variable in three different 
ways. First, I use the data from the first part of this question where firms directly 
stated the figure to define the advertising as a percentage of sales, namely, the 
variable ADP. The mean advertising to sales ratio of the ADP variable is reported as 
2.7 percent. Second, I construct a variable, CADP, combining the data from part (a) of 
the question and using the midpoint for the firms who only categorical data was 
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available from part (b) of the question. The construction of this variable almost 
doubles the sample size available for analysis and the mean advertising to sales ratio 
is reduced to 2.4 percent. Third, as 13 percent of firms stated that they did not 
advertise at all in an early question and were not asked to complete the question about 
advertising as a percentage of their sales, I construct a variable, NCADP, which is 
composed of values of zero percent for firms who stated they did not advertise plus 
the CADP variable. As expected, the mean advertising to sales ratio is further 
reduced, to a value of 1.9 percent, and the overall sample size is increased to its 
highest level.  
3.3.2 Entry Deterrence Strategy 
An ordinal measure for the importance of entry deterrence as an aim of firms’ 
advertising expenditures is provided in the data. The question “to what extent is the 
aim of your advertising to make it difficult for other companies to enter the market” 
provides me with a good indicator of firms which use advertising to deter entry. The 
proportion of advertising managers responding to each category are as follows: 35 
percent ‘Not at all’; 16 percent ‘Quite unimportant’; 26 percent ‘Neither important or 
unimportant’; 14 percent ‘quite important’; and 9 percent ‘very important’.  
Advertising managers that responded ‘Not at all’, ‘Quite unimportant’ or ‘Neither 
important or unimportant’ were taken to not use advertising as an entry deterrence 
strategy and the 23 percent of all firms who answered ‘quite important’ or ‘very 
important’ were taken to use advertising to impose a barrier to entry. A dummy 
variable, AIMENT, is given a value of zero if the advertising manager responded in 
any of the first three categories, and a value of one if they responded in the other two 
categories indicating entry deterrence behaviour.  
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3.3.3 Sectors 
Advertising to sales ratios vary across sectors.  In the survey, firms classified 
themselves into seven categories: 12 percent of firms manufacture consumer goods 
(CMSEC), 22 percent manufacture producer goods (PMSEC), 10 percent are 
distribution firms (DISTSEC), 8 percent are in the retail sector (RETSEC), 28 percent 
service firms (SERSEC), and 20 percent are classified as other (OSEC). Categorical 
dummy variables are constructed to allow for differences across sectors. The 
distribution sector is chosen as the excluded category. This specification allows some 
evaluation of sectors where consumption externalities are more likely (e.g. 
manufacturing (consumer goods) and retail) compared to other sectors where 
consumption externalities are less likely. 
3.3.4 Turnover 
Turnover is included as a control for market share. A greater turnover is associated 
with a larger market share. In the survey, firms provided data on company turnover in 
the last financial year. Annual turnover is recorded in Millions GBP and the sample 
mean is £287.5025 million. In Farris and Albion’s (1981) review a larger market 
share is associated with a relatively lower advertising intensity. Jones (1990) findings 
show that in the packaged goods market, brands with lower market shares spend 
relatively more on advertising compared to those with higher shares. At the firm level, 
Farris and Buzzell (1979) and Rundfelt (1973) also find a negative relationship 
between market share and advertising to sales ratios. Intuitively, firms with large 
market shares should be familiar to consumers and therefore require a lower 
advertising to sales ratio. The log value of turnover (LNTURN) is used as, on 
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inspection of the data, it appears that the relationship is non-linear and this 
specification provides a better fit to the data.  
3.3.5 Number of Competing Firms 
In the absence of a measure of the set-up cost of entry which is found to be an 
important determinant of advertising expenditure in Whelan (2011), the best proxy, 
given the data, is the number of firms competing in the market for the firm’s main 
product line/service. It is assumed that the fewer firms competing in the market, that 
is, the more concentrated the market, the higher the fixed cost of entry. Dummy 
variables are constructed to identify firms with 0-1, 2-5, 6-10, and 10 or more firms 
competing in the market for their main product line/service. Two percent of firms fall 
into the 0-1 category, 21 percent with 2-5, 21 percent with 6-10 and 56 percent with 
10 or more competitors. The excluded category is firms with the lowest level of 
competition, i.e. 0-1 competitors for their main product line/service.  
3.3.6 Size of the Market 
The size of the overall market to the firm can be expected to affect the chosen 
advertising intensity. A dummy variable is included with a value of one if a firm 
indicates that its only market is regional as opposed to the larger market sizes of the 
UK, EU or International. Twelve percent of firms indicated that their only market is 
regional. If the coefficient is negative on this variable it would indicate that when a 
firm’s market is regional (small) it has a lower advertising to sales ratio.  
Missing data reduces the final useable sample. Only 327 firms answered the specific 
advertising to sales question (ADP) so this is the smallest sample. When combined 
with the categorical data on firms’ advertising to sales ratios the sample is increased 
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to 664 observations (CADP). The greatest sample size is 776 observations when the 
firms who report no advertising expenditure (NCADP) are included. Other variables 
suffer from missing data to a lesser extent; in these cases the missing data problem is 
homogenous across variables and less problematic.  
In examining the relationship between firm’s entry deterrence behaviour and 
advertising expenditure it may be suggested that higher advertising expenditure may 
drive higher entry deterrence behaviour; therefore, a possible issue of endogeneity 
arises. Alternatively, an unobserved variable may jointly determine both high levels 
of advertising and entry deterrence behaviour. I attempt to control for other factors 
that may influence advertising behaviour and establish correlations between the two 
variables to indicate the direction of the relationship. This allows me to test the idea of 
over- or under-advertising that already exists in the theoretical literature.   
 
2.4 RESULTS 
Table 2.1 presents OLS estimates of the impact of entry deterrence behaviour on 
advertising intensity. The dependent variable is the advertising to sales ratio for the 
firm reported by the advertising manager. The ADP variable refers to only the firms 
who gave their advertising to sales ratio in percentage terms and the CADP variable 
refers to the constructed variable which includes the data from ADP, plus data from 
the firms who answered which category their advertising to sales ratio was in, for 
which I used the midpoint of the range.  
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TABLE 2.1: OLS estimates of advertising expenditure as a percentage of sales  
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Model (1) 
ADP 
Model (2) 
CADP 
Model (3) 
ADP 
Model (4) 
CADP 
  
Independent 
Variables 
     
AIMENT 2.17** 1.18** 2.53*** 1.36**   
 (0.91) (0.50) (0.94) (0.57)   
CMSEC   2.70** 1.67***  
   (1.24) (0.56)  
PMSEC   0.88 0.40  
   (1.14) (0.48)  
RETSEC   2.38 2.18***  
   (1.48) (0.80)  
SETSEC   1.61 0.77  
   (1.49) (0.56)  
OSEC   1.39 0.92*   
   (1.17) (0.50)   
LN(TURN)   -0.22 -0.18**   
   (0.14) (0.08)   
NFMS      
2-5   -8.89 -4.22   
   (8.77) (4.59)   
6-10   -8.22 -3.68   
   (8.53) (4.52)   
10+   -8.62 -4.03   
   (8.71) (4.55)   
REGM   -0.64 -0.77   
   (0.94) (0.57)   
_cons 2.33*** 2.08*** 9.99 5.73   
 (0.21) (0.14) (7.75) (4.34)   
      
R² 
N 
0.04 
317 
0.02 
636 
0.12 
283 
0.07 
540 
 
Notes: 
i. M1 and M3: The dependant variable is advertising as a percentage of sales as reported by 
firms. 
ii. M2 and M4: The dependant variable is advertising as a percentage of sales as reported by 
firms and as reported in categories where the midpoint is used. 
iii. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
iv. Standard errors are reported in brackets for M1 and M2. 
v. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets for M3 and M4. 
vi. R² can only be compared across models with the same dependent variables. 
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The first specification in the table (Model 1 and Model 2), contains no additional 
regressors (other than a constant term) and compares the dependent variables ADP 
and CADP. In Model 1, the coefficient on the entry deterrence dummy (AIMENT), 
which identifies a firm aiming to deter entry with its advertising, implies that the 
average increase in advertising to sales ratio associated with entry deterrence 
behaviour is around 2.2 percent and this is highly significant. This marginal effect 
indicates that a firm with entry deterrence as an aim of its advertising is estimated to 
have a 93 percent increase in its advertising intensity compared to a firm who does 
not use advertising to deter entry, i.e. an advertising to sales ratio of 4.5 percent 
compared to 2.33 percent.  
The coefficient on the entry deterrence dummy in Model 2 implies that the average 
increase in advertising to sales ratio associated with entry deterrence behaviour is 
lower than in Model 1 at an increase of around 1.2 percent (approximately a 57 
percent increase for firms who indicate that entry deterrence is an aim of their 
advertising) and this result is also highly significant.  
Models 3 and 4 in the table include controls that determine advertising to sales ratios 
as discussed in the data section earlier. Specifically, some firm characteristics are 
controlled for, such as, sector, number of competing firms, turnover, and market size. 
These variables are included in an attempt to assess to what extent differences in firm 
characteristics affect advertising intensity.  
In Model 3, the coefficient on the entry deterrence dummy is around 2.5 implying that 
the advertising to sales ratio associated with entry deterrence behaviour is around 2.5 
percent greater and this is highly significant. Again Model 4 produces a lower 
coefficient indicating an increase of 1.36 percent.  Across all four models, all 
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coefficients for the entry deterrence dummy are positive and significant at (at least) 
the 5 percent level. Inclusion of the control variables increases the coefficient on the 
entry deterrence dummy marginally in both Models 3 and 4 while remaining 
significant. Thus, there is no evidence that the advertising effect is the result of these 
industry specific factors.  
The results of Model 4 indicate that turnover is negatively associated with advertising 
intensity and the coefficients here can be interpreted as elasticities where a one 
percent increase in turnover (Millions GBP) results in a 0.18 percent reduction in 
advertising intensity. This negative relationship supports the findings of Rundfelt 
(1973), Farris and Buzzell (1979), and Jones (1990). 
The dummy variables controlling for sector differences indicate that consumer 
manufacturing products are positively associated with advertising intensity in models 
3 and 4, compared to the excluded distribution sector category. Again Model 4, using 
the combined advertising to sales ratio (CADP), produces a lower coefficient 
indicating an increase of around 1.7 percent, compared to the 2.7 percent produced in 
Model 3. The retail sector (RETSEC) becomes significant in Model 4 with a positive 
coefficient of 2.18 percent. None of the effects relating to the number of firms or size 
of the market are statistically significantly different from zero, indicating no 
relationship between the fixed cost of entry or overall size of the market with firm’s 
advertising intensity.   
OLS estimation is sensitive to violations of standard assumptions regarding the error 
term. Diagnostic tests suggest that the null hypothesis of homoskedastic errors 
(Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test) should be rejected. The existence of different 
variances is often encountered when using cross-sectional firm data. Confidence 
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intervals and the validity of hypothesis tests that use the standard errors usually 
computed for the OLS estimator may be misleading. Therefore, standard errors robust 
to heteroscedasticity are reported in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 for Models 3 and 4. 
On inspection there appeared to be some outliers in relation to the advertising to sales 
ratios (ADP) and turnover variables (TURN). In relation to the advertising to sales 
ratio, three large outliers were identified as values more than three standard deviations 
away from the mean.  In relation to turnover, seven outliers were identified with 
values more than three standard deviations away from the mean.  In the analysis 
reported below in Table 2.2, as a robustness check, outliers are reassigned the value of 
three standard deviations away from the mean, to help to retain the cases but to reduce 
the impact of the extreme values on the regression results.  
With adjustment of the outliers, across all four models, all coefficients for the entry 
deterrence dummy remain positive and highly significant, but as expected they are 
lower relative to those reported without adjustments. The marginal effects on the 
coefficient on the entry deterrence dummy (AIMENT) in Table 2.3 is around 1.5 
percent in model 1 (67 percent increase in advertising intensity) and 0.8 percent in 
model 2 (40 percent increase in advertising intensity). When controls are included, in 
model 3 the coefficient is around 1.9 percent and again model 4 produces a lower 
coefficient indicating an increase of 0.9 percent. As a final robustness check, the 
analysis was re-estimated excluding the outliers which confirmed that the results are 
not driven by the outliers.  
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TABLE 2.2: OLS estimates of advertising expenditure as a percentage of sales   
(Outliers adjusted)  
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Model (1) 
ADP 
Model (2) 
CADP 
Model (3) 
ADP 
Model (4) 
CADP 
  
Independent 
Variables 
     
AIMENT 1.53*** 0.80*** 1.86*** 0.89**   
 (0.45) (0.28) (0.64) (0.36)   
CMSEC   1.94** 1.41***  
   (0.85) (0.49)  
PMSEC   0.22 0.15  
   (0.74) (0.39)  
RETSEC   1.59 1.87***  
   (1.12) (0.69)  
SERSEC   0.49 0.42  
   (0.79) (0.38)  
OSEC   0.53 0.74*   
   (0.76) (0.42)   
LN(TURN)   -0.31*** -0.19***   
   (0.11) (0.07)   
NFMS      
2-5   -1.83 -0.62   
   (2.79) (1.21)   
6-10   -1.62 -0.24   
   (2.71) (1.20)   
10+   -1.68 -0.50   
   (2.75) (1.18)   
REGM   -0.97 -0.91**   
   (0.61) (0.36)   
_cons 2.27*** 2.04*** 4.26* 2.53**   
 (0.21) (0.13) (2.46) (1.17)   
      
      
N  
R² 
Prob > F 
317 
0.04 
0.00 
636 
0.02 
0.01 
283 
0.10 
0.03 
540 
0.06 
0.00 
 
           Notes: 
i. M1 and M3: The dependant variable is advertising as a percentage of sales as reported by 
firms. 
ii. M2 and M4: The dependant variable is advertising as a percentage of sales as reported by 
firms and as reported in categories where the midpoint is used. 
iii. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
iv. Standard errors are reported in brackets for M1 and M2. 
v. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets for M3 and M4. 
vi. R² can only be compared across models with the same dependent variables. 
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Tobit analysis was also used to include the 13 percent of firms who indicated that they 
did not advertise at all. The advertising ratios included for these firms were zero and 
the importance of entry deterrence as an aim of their advertising was included as 
unimportant i.e. a value of zero entered for the entry deterrence dummy (AIMENT). 
Results are reported in Table 2.3 below where the estimates for the entry deterrence 
variable can be seen as positive and highly significant in all models. In fact, all 
estimates are greater than the estimates using the OLS estimation technique. This 
suggests that by only considering the firms who are advertising underestimates the 
relationship between advertising intensity and entry deterrence behaviour.  
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TABLE 2.3: Tobit estimates of advertising expenditure as a percentage of sales  
(Outliers adjusted)  
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Model (1) 
NADP 
Model (2) 
NCADP 
Model (3) 
NADP 
Model (4) 
NCADP 
  
Independent 
Variables 
     
NAIMENT 3.16*** 1.60*** 3.12*** 1.50***   
 (0.49) (0.30) (0.53) (0.32)   
CMSEC   2.28** 1.42***  
   (0.90) (0.54)  
PMSEC   0.16 0.07  
   (0.80) (0.47)  
RETSEC   2.08 1.91***  
   (0.98) (0.60)  
SETSEC   1.06 0.56  
   (0.80) (0.46)  
OSEC   0.93 0.84*   
   (0.85) (0.49)   
LN(TURN)   -0.20* -0.13**   
   (0.10) (0.06)   
NFMS      
2-5   -1.82 -0.53   
   (1.53) (0.94)   
6-10   -0.92 0.11   
   (1.52) (0.93)   
10+   -1.21 -0.28   
   (1.49) (0.91)   
REGM   -0.31 -0.54   
   (0.65) (0.41)   
_cons 0.65*** 1.26*** 1.91 1.43   
 (0.21) (0.13) (1.55) (0.99)   
sigma 3.76 
(0.15) 
3.15 
(0.09) 
3.63 
(0.16) 
3.02 
(0.09) 
 
N 
Log Likelihood 
Prob > chi² 
Pseudo R² 
Proportion Advertising 
432 
-953.70372 
0.00 
0.02 
0.63 
748 
-1724.2203 
0.00 
0.01 
0.82 
355 
-819.33236 
0.00 
0.03 
0.74 
610 
-1421.0043 
0.00 
0.02 
0.87 
 
Notes: 
i. M1 and M3: The dependant variable is advertising as a percentage of sales as reported by 
firms (includes firms who reported no advertising as zero percent). 
ii. M2 and M4: The dependant variable is advertising as a percentage of sales as reported by 
firms and as reported in categories where the midpoint is used (includes firms who 
reported no advertising as zero percent). 
iii. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
iv. Standard errors are reported in brackets  
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
Incumbent firms can have a significant advantage over potential entrants by erecting 
barriers to entry, thereby benefiting from a lower degree of competition. In this paper 
I investigate the relationship between the advertising and entry deterrence behaviour 
by analysing survey data from over 800 UK firms from the AIS Dataset. The results 
indicate that if a firm perceives expenditure on advertising as an important tool to 
deter entry into the market it will increase its advertising intensity. This is important 
because strategic investments in advertising are anti-competitive and may adversely 
affect welfare. The behaviour of a potential entrant is influenced by making entry 
unprofitable without obvious signs of preventing entry. This is a policy predicament 
making antitrust investigation very difficult. 
The theoretical literature on advertising to deter entry either suggests over- or under-
investment in advertising, relative to the non-strategic benchmark, depending on what 
type of oligopoly is used. Some papers determine that it is optimal for the firm to 
decrease its advertising expenditure to establish a small group of consumers for their 
product and constrain itself to a low price in the threat of entry. Others determine that 
it is optimal for a firm to increase its advertising expenditure, establish a large 
potential consumer base, and combine a low output with a high price. 
This paper provides empirical support for the theoretical findings of Krahmer (2006), 
Bagwell (2007), Doraszelski and Marovich (2007), and Whelan (2011) and that point 
to entry deterrence cases where the incumbent monopolist over-invests in advertising. 
This paper also supports Paton’s (2008) empirical study which explores the 
determinants of the importance of entry deterrence to advertising managers and finds 
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a strong correlation between the perceived importance of advertising as an entry 
deterrence tool and the intensity of advertising spending.  
However, the result of this paper is in contrast to the theoretical findings of 
Schmalensee (1983), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), and Ishigaki (2000) where the 
threat of entry induces the incumbent monopolist to advertise less than it would if 
entry were not possible. The results of this empirical analysis show that firms which 
indicate that strategic entry deterrence is an aim of their advertising are significantly 
more likely to have a greater advertising to sales ratio. Furthermore, a firm which 
indicated that entry deterrence is an aim of its advertising is associated with an 
increased advertising intensity of above 57%.  
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2.7 APPENDIX 
Table 2.4: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics   
Names Definition Mean  SD 
Dependent variables:   
ADP 
ADP (outliers adj.) 
Proportion of total advertising to sales as reported by the manager for this year (1999) (327 observations) 
As above with three large outliers adjusted to the value three standard deviations from the mean 
2.744 
2.552 
   4.626 
3.384 
NADP As above with zero percent added for firms who reported not advertising (442 observations) 1.888 3.118 
 
CADP Proportion of total advertising to sales as reported by the manager for this year (1999), combined with  2.285 3.770 
CADP (outliers adj.) 
categorical data using the midpoint of categories (664 observations) 
As above with three large outliers adjusted to the value three standard deviations from the mean 2.165 2.926 
NCADP As above with zero percent added for firms who reported not advertising (776 observations) 1.851 2.812 
Independent variables:   
AIMENT Dummy variable equalling 1 if importance of entry deterrence was ranked as quite important or very  0.224 0.417 
 important by the manager   
NAIMENT As above with zero included for firms who reported not advertising  0.192 0.394 
CMSEC Dummy variable equalling 1 if the manager states the company's main product/service is in manufacturing 0.120 0.325 
 (consumer goods)   
PMSEC Dummy variable equalling 1 if the manager states the company's main product/service is in manufacturing 0.216 0.411 
 (producer goods)   
DISTSEC Dummy variable equalling 1 if the manager states the company's main product/service is in distribution 0.103 0.304 
RETSEC Dummy variable equalling 1 if the manager states the company's main product/service is in retail 0.082 0.275 
SERSEC Dummy variable equalling 1 if the manager states the company's main product/service is in services 0.282 0.450 
OSEC Dummy variable equalling 1 if the manager states the company's main product/service is in 'other'  0.196 0.400 
REGM Dummy variable equalling 1 if the manger indicates that the market for its main product/services is regional 0.114 0.318 
TURN 
LNTURN 
Company's annual turnover in the last financial year (1998) in Millions GBP as reported by the manager  
Natural log of the above variable: ln(TURN) 
287.50 
3.216 
1645.875 
2.085 
LNTURN(outliersadj.) As above with seven outliers adjusted to the value three standard deviations from the mean 3.225 2.042 
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3. System Wars: The Power of Network 
Externalities 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In a market with network externalities the relative network intensity across products is likely 
to have consequences for advertising expenditures, prices and the market equilibrium. I 
introduce network externalities and persuasive advertising into a Hotelling framework to 
investigate two firms producing different varieties of a good in a market with network 
externalities. Firms’ optimal advertising and pricing strategies are shown to depend on the 
strength of the network externality for their product. In spite of differences in network 
intensities, the findings show that both firms can exist simultaneously in the market. The firm 
with the stronger network externality dominates. This result highlights a “Matthew Effect”, 
where the initial advantage is self-amplifying. In equilibrium, this dominant firm, when 
compared to the firm with the lower network intensity, will have higher advertising 
expenditure, price, market share and profits. 
 
 
Keywords 
Network Externalities, Persuasive Advertising, Product Differentiation, Spatial Competition, 
Network Effects, Interdependent Preferences. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION  
In the midst of a system war, a consumer is faced with two or more products, and, all else 
equal, they wish to purchase the brand or system that is more heavily purchased. For 
example, due to online gaming, the decision about which gaming console to purchase 
involves expectations about which console will be more heavily purchased in addition to the 
relative prices and qualities of the rival firms’ products. Microsoft and Sony launched a 
console war with their products, Xbox 360 and Playstation 3, respectively, in 2005. Other 
examples of such wars are: Microsoft 95 versus IBM OS/2 in the computer software market, 
HD-DVD versus Blu-Ray in the DVD player market, and Apple versus Samsung in the 
smartphone market.  
In such markets, the utility that a consumer derives from the product increases with the 
expected number of other consumers purchasing the same brand due to network effects. 
Some other modern examples include: mobile networks, tablet computers, computer 
operating systems and/or applications, social networking sites, websites (Ebay, Google, Wiki, 
etc), credit cards, electric cars, pharmaceutical drugs, music players, and video recorders.  
In this paper I introduce persuasive advertising and network externalities into a Hotelling 
framework to investigate two firms producing different varieties of a good competing in a 
market with network externalities. This work draws on two strands of industrial organisation 
literature: persuasive advertising and network externalities. Persuasive advertising affects 
demand by changing tastes and creating brand loyalty.
6
 The advertised brand faces a lower 
elasticity of demand; consumers are less price sensitive.
7
 By examining U.S. manufacturing 
industries, Bain (1956) and Comanor and Wilson (1967) offer the earliest empirical support 
                                                 
6
 Bagwell (2007) provides a complete survey of the economics of advertising. 
7
 Braithwaite (1928) was the first to develop persuasive advertising. Robinson (1933) and Spence (1980) find 
that persuasive advertising creates brand loyalty. 
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for persuasive advertising and evidence is presented that advertising intensity exerts a 
significantly positive influence on the explanation of profits.
8 In this paper, I analyse 
persuasive advertising in the spirit of Khatibi and Vergote (2011).
9
 Their paper analyses 
pricing, non-price instuments (e.g. advertising) and trade policy barriers. My approach differs 
by analysing optimal pricing and advertising decisions for a duopoly in a market with 
network externalities.  
Persuasive advertising is particularly important in markets with network externalities. 
Network externalities arise in markets where the utility a consumer derives from the 
consumption of a product increases with the number of other consumers purchasing the same 
product either due to network or social interaction effects.
10
 Two sources of economic value 
are significant for the consumer: the inherent value (a consumer derives value from their own 
use of the product) and the network value (a consumer derives value from other consumers’ 
use of the product). A network externality by nature is a positive consumption externality.
11
 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) state two ways in which network externalities can occur. Direct 
network externalities exist when an increase in the size of a network increases the number of 
                                                 
8
 This is consistent with the hypothesis that advertising creates brand loyalty. 
9
 Khatibi and Vergote (2011) analyse pricing, non-price instruments and trade policy barriers to show that 
whether a tariff is placed on the non-price instrument or on the good itself, the foreign firm prefers to increase 
its use of its pricing tool and give up some of its use of the non-price instrument. Furthermore, in the presence of 
a non-price instrument, tariffs do not always lead both firms to increase their price: it can lead the foreign firm 
to decrease its price. 
 
10
 Farrell and Klemperer (2007) provide a complete survey of the economics of network effects. Rohlfs (1974) 
originally applied the insight of network externalities to analyse the origins and development of communication 
networks. Early research focused on examples such as telephones and fax machines. Except for applications to 
communications, the analysis of markets with network externalities lay largely dormant until the 1980s. At that 
point, economic historians such as David (1985) as well as economic theorists such as Farrell and Saloner 
(1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1985) began to explore these issues. 
11
 Chwe (2001), Clark and Horstmann (2005), Pastine and Pastine (2002, 2011), and Sahuguet (2011) show that 
in markets with positive consumption externalities firms may engage in advertising competition in order to 
coordinate consumer expectations on their own brand. Whelan (2011) establishes that even when consumers and 
firms are fully informed of a product’s existence, characteristics, price and production costs a role for 
coordination advertising still exists as a tool for entry deterrence in the presence of positive consumption 
externalities.  
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others with whom one can interact directly. Indirect network externalities exist when an 
increase in the size of a consumer base expands the range of complementary products 
available. Economic agents are not always purely self-interested; they have interdependent 
preferences where their utility function will depend on the decisions of other consumers.  
In this paper, two firms play a two-stage game. In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose 
their investment level of advertising, and in the second stage, they compete in prices. 
Consumers observe firms’ advertising and pricing decisions then simultaneously make their 
purchasing decisions. I first construct a benchmark case where firms’ marginal network 
externalities are symmetric across brands. Second, I introduce an exogenous difference in 
firms’ network externalities and analyse firms’ advertising expenditures, pricing, profits and 
market shares in comparison to the benchmark case.  
As in Hotelling (1929) product differences are modelled by their location at extreme ends of 
a distinct product space. Heterogeneous consumer preferences are modelled by their location 
along the same space. Firms invest in advertising in order to change the product or brand’s 
image. Advertising in this model can also be considered as an investment to improve the 
product’s design, increase technology, promotion of the product using a celebrity 
endorsement or anything else that will change its perceived ‘quality’ or ‘location’ for 
consumers.  
In this paper, I analyse outcomes when the market is shared by two products.  There are many 
examples of products competing in markets with network externalities where more than one 
firm exists. I wish to examine the optimal pricing and advertising decisions for firms in this 
situation. In order for this outcome to occur, the demand by some users for the intrinsic 
characteristics of the good on a less popular network must be especially strong. Firms are 
competing for consumers. They can increase their chances of gaining extra consumers by 
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spending more money on product enhancements, advertising, or price reductions. In this 
paper, I address the question of optimal advertising investment and pricing decisions for each 
firm, knowing that its competitor is facing similar decisions.  
In the benchmark case with symmetric network externalities, prices are shown to be strategic 
complements whereas advertising expenditures are strategic substitutes. I show that the 
presence of network externalities intensifies competition between the two firms, leading to 
increased price competition. I find that as the network effect becomes more significant in 
consumers’ preferences, equilibrium prices are reduced. With symmetric network 
externalities, when both firms are observed in the market they gain equal market share and 
profits with symmetric advertising expenditure and prices. The game is a prisoner’s dilemma 
as higher profits could be attained if they reduced their spending on advertising. However, in 
a one shot game, they cannot trust that their rival will not advertise. 
Subsequently, I introduce an exogenous difference in network externalities across products 
and show that, despite this difference, in equilibrium both firms will simultaneously exist in 
the market.  Furthermore, optimal pricing and advertising strategies are found to differ across 
firms. The main result associated with relative differences in network externalities highlights 
a “Matthew Effect”: “to those who have, more shall be given”.12 In this paper, I show that the 
firm with the stronger network externality dominates the market. This dominant firm, in 
equilibrium, when compared to the firm with the lower network intensity, will have higher 
advertising expenditure, price, market share and profits.  
                                                 
12
 The term “Matthew Effect”: was coined by the sociologist Robert K. Merton (1968) to refer to his theory of 
cumulative advantage in science. The phenomenon was named after a verse in the Gospel of Matthew (13:12) 
which states that "for whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever 
hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath". Mrázová and Neary (2013) also refer to the 
“Matthew Effect” when examining selection effects with heterogenous firms. 
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The type of products in markets with network externalities are ever increasing due to the 
growth of network effects, increased connectivity and ease of social interaction. When 
competing in a market with network externalities, the relative value of a network externality 
across products is likely to have consequences for advertising expenditures, prices and the 
market equilibrium. The theory of network effects, or consumption externalities, has 
fundamental importance for competition policy, regulation, business strategy, intellectual 
property, and technical change in a wide range of industries. Developments in these growing 
industries cannot be fully understood without understanding the power of network 
externalities. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 3.2, I develop the model framework. 
The equilibrium is developed in Section 3.3 where I discuss outcomes with symmetric and 
asymmetric network externalities. Section 3.4 provides a further discussion of the market for 
online gaming consoles and section 3.5 concludes. 
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3.2 MODEL 
Two firms, 1 and 2, compete over two stages. In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose 
their investment level of advertising, and in the second stage, they compete in prices. 
Consumers observe firms’ advertising and pricing decisions then simultaneously make their 
purchasing decisions. This is a rational expectations model where consumers’ expectations 
are consistent with equilibrium outcomes. Communication between consumers is not 
considered. There are no fixed costs in the model.  
Marginal production costs are assumed to be constant and equal to zero. The level of 
investment in advertising is denoted by   ,        . Let       and       denote the 
associated cost of advertising, given by:
13
 
                         
 
 
  
                                                                              
where   is a positive parameter. If   were to increase it is more costly for the firms to invest in 
advertising.  
There is a continuum of consumers, uniformly distributed along a line. The population size is 
normalised to one. Firms have a fixed location and are located at opposite ends of this line: 
Firm 1 is located at point zero and firm 2 at point one. Consumers are differentiated by their 
location on the unit line,        . A consumer’s location   represents the location of his 
ideal brand and characterises his relative tastes for the two available products. A consumer 
located   units of distance from firm 1 pays a “transportation” cost of    when purchasing 
from firm 1 and        when purchasing from firm 2. The “transportation” cost     
measures the per unit of distance transport cost. This “transportation” cost is interpreted as a 
                                                 
13
 I assume a quadratic functional form, common to the advertising literature. Khatibi and Vergote (2011), 
Hernández-García, J. M. (1997), Bester and Petrakis (1996), Levy and Gerlowsky (1991), and Economides 
(1989) use a similar quadratic functional form. The curvature of the quadratic functional form makes solving the 
problem more straight forward.  
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“mismatch cost” representing the consumer’s disutility associated with buying a brand 
different to their ideal brand. Consumers face a discrete choice in this model: they purchase 1 
unit from either firm 1 or firm 2 but not both.  
The utility of the consumer located at  ,        , buying from firm 1 or firm 2, is 
respectively given by: 
   
                                                                             
  
                                                                     
where    denotes the proportion of consumers buying from firm i.  The network effect (    is 
multiplied by the proportion of consumers who choose to purchase the same brand. For 
convenience of notation, firm 2’s network externality is expressed in terms of firm 1’s, 
        where        Due to network externalities, all else equal, consumers wish to 
purchase the brand that is purchased by a greater proportion of the market. The intrinsic value 
( ) is assumed to be symmetric across the two brands. If neither firm chooses to use 
advertising (         and there is no difference in network externalities across products 
(    , consumers buy from the firm with the best price-location combination. I consider 
two cases: first, the benchmark case, where the value of the network externality is symmetric 
across products (    , and second, where firm 2’s product has a higher network externality 
than firm 1’s, (      
In order to guarantee interior solutions, thus focusing on the case in which both firms are in 
the market, I assume that consumer’s disutility associated with a product different from his 
ideal brand is strong enough to ensure that some consumers continue to purchase each of the 
products in equilibrium, even in the presence of network externalities:   
 
  
 
       
 
  14  
                                                 
14
 See appendix A(ii) for the proof of this stability condition. 
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3.3 EQUILIBRIUM 
In this section, I solve the model by backward induction. I begin by solving the second-stage 
optimal pricing decisions for firms. Subsequently, I determine the firms’ optimal advertising 
decisions. For expositional clarity, I will give all the derivations for the general case (     
and discuss the outcomes for the symmetric benchmark (     and the asymmetric case 
(      separately in each stage. 
 
3.3.1 Stage 2: Prices 
Firm demands are derived by determining the consumer who is indifferent between 
purchasing from firm 1 or firm 2, denoted by  . By definition, the utility obtained by this 
consumer is the same for either brand, that is: 
                                                                                     
The demand functions are derived, by letting       and        ), as: 
         
                       
          
                                                         
   
                      
          
                                                           
Equations (5) and (6) are market shares for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. If firms choose 
not to advertise, then consumers will make their purchasing decisions based on the relative 
prices and their location. At this stage, all else equal, a firm would need to advertise more 
than the rival firm or charge a lower price to increase its demand.  
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In the benchmark case, when the network externalities across firms are equal, (    , for 
equal pricing and advertising expenditure, the demand functions in equations (5) and (6) are 
symmetric. In the asymmetric case, where firm 2’s product has a greater marginal network 
externality,    , for equal pricing and advertising expenditure, Firm 1 (with the lower 
network externality) can be seen to have a lower market share than Firm 2 as       
In the second stage, firms compete in prices. The optimization problems for firms 1 and 2 are, 
respectively, given by:  
          
                       
          
 
 
 
  
                                      
          
                      
          
 
 
 
  
                                        
From the first-order conditions,     
                     
   
   
 
                        
          
                                                                                                       
   
   
 
                       
          
                                                  
And, the second-order conditions require,  
       
    
   
  
    
   
  
  
          
                                                       
I derive the pricing reaction functions
15
: 
    
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
   
 
 
                                                                
                                                 
15
 Please refer to Appendices A(i) for stability condition proofs. 
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The reaction functions show that prices are strategic complements. Figure 1 depicts the 
pricing reaction functions when network externalities are symmetric,    . The reaction 
function for firm 1 shifts to the left with asymmetric network externalities,    . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the first-order conditions, (9) and (10), the second-stage equilibrium prices are: 
                                                                     
 
 
                                                              
                   
 
 
                                                               
And, equilibrium quantities are: 
    
                 
             
                                                         
   
                
             
                                                           
Hence, firm’s profits are equal to: 
   
                   
 
             
                                                  
   
                  
 
             
                                                     
  
1 
  
2 
       
       
 
 
             
 
 
              
Figure 3.1: Price Reaction Functions  
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In the benchmark case, given that I assume firms to be symmetric, without loss of generality, 
I will adopt the perspective of firm 1. Under symmetry when the network externalities across 
firms are equal, (    , equilibrium price, quantity and profits simplify to:                                                            
   
 
 
                    
             
       
    
               
 
        
. Thus, prices, 
market share and profits depend positively on own advertising expenditure and negatively on 
the advertising expenditure of the rival.  
The term        denotes the consumer’s disutility or distaste associated with buying a 
brand different to their ideal brand less the benefit to the consumer from the network 
externality. This “transportation” cost     is interpreted as a “mismatch cost” and the greater 
this cost the less likely consumers with a location preference for firm   are to consume the 
rival brand. Therefore,   enters positively in the price equations. Firms will charge higher 
prices as consumer’s disutility or distaste associated with purchasing a brand that differs from 
their ideal brand increases. Conversely, the value of the network externality enters negatively 
into the price equations. The presence of positive network externalities increases competition 
between firms and results in lower prices. Due to the positive network externality, a reduction 
in the price of firm  ’s product increases the demand for firm  , and due to this increase in 
demand the product becomes even more attractive to other consumers, increasing the demand 
for firm   further.  
In the asymmetric case, where firm 2’s product has a greater marginal network externality, 
   , the results show that, similar to the benchmark case, equilibrium prices for firm i will 
depend positively on the advertising expenditure of firm i and negatively on the advertising 
expenditure of the rival firm. Holding advertising expenditures equal, firm 1’s price, market 
share and profits are lower than firm 2’s      . Firm 1 has a lower network externality than 
firm 2 and must compensate for this fact by charging a lower price to entice consumers onto 
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its brand and remain in the market. As before, the higher the “transport” cost per unit the 
higher the prices of both products and the value of the network externality enters negatively 
into the price equations. 
Result 1. Given the levels of advertising, in the presence of positive network externalities, 
prices fall as the consumer’s transport cost (disutility associated with purchasing away from 
their ideal brand) decreases and as network externalities become more significant in 
consumers’ preferences (n increases).  
 
3.3.2 Stage 1: Advertising 
In the first stage, the optimization problems for firm 1 and 2 are given by:        
              
                       
          
 
 
 
  
                                    
            
                      
          
 
 
 
  
                                    
The first-order conditions are given by:        
                   
   
   
 
                                      
             
                                
                  
   
   
 
                                     
             
                                    
And, the second-order conditions require,           
                                             
    
   
  
    
   
  
                   
             
                                          
In the symmetric case, I will, again, adopt the perspective of firm 1. Under symmetry when 
the network externalities across firms are equal, (    , the advertising reaction function of 
firm 1 simplifies to     
          
          
 . 
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The reaction functions show that advertising expenditures are strategic substitutes. Figure 2 
depicts the advertising reaction functions when network externalities are symmetric,    . 
The reaction functions for both firms shifts to the left with asymmetric network externalities, 
   . Firm 1’s reaction function shifts further to the left than Firm 2’s for any given z>1. 
In the symmetric case, the subgame perfect equilibrium advertising, quantity and profits 
simplify to:        
 
  
                   
 
 
  and       
          
   
      
Result 2.  In the benchmark case with symmetric network externalities, when    
 
  
   ,  
there is a stable equilibrium where advertising, pricing, demands and profits for firms 1 and 
2 are equal. 
 
The result here shows that in the benchmark case where network externalities are the same 
across firms, firms will share the market equally in equilibrium with identical prices and 
expenditure on advertising. Market shares are equal in comparison to the Hotelling model 
without advertising or network externalities. However, the prices are affected negatively by 
                   
       
             
                
 
 
 
           
 
                 
                
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Advertising Reaction Functions 
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the network externality and positively by the transport cost, as seen in the analysis of the 
pricing stage.  
In the case of an interior equilibrium in the second stage, the second order conditions of both 
firms are satisfied when   
 
  
 
       
 
  Furthermore, I consider the condition for reaction 
function stability which states that own effects of advertising on marginal profits dominate 
cross effects. The equilibrium is locally unstable with transport costs such that                               
 
  
 
       
 
     
 
  
 
       
 
  . I focus my attention on locally (and globally) stable 
equilibria;   
 
  
 
       
 
  .16 From the first-order conditions (22) and (23), I derive the 
advertising reaction functions: 
   
                 
                
                                                            
               
                
                
                                                              
 
Result 3. In the presence of asymmetric positive network externalities both firms will exist in 
the market, when   
 
  
 
       
 
  The firm with the greater network externality will 
dominate with higher advertising expenditure, price, market share and profits compared to 
the firm with the lower network intensity.   
 
The result above provides a new example of a “Matthew Effect” in markets with relative 
differences in network externalities where an initial advantage begets further advantage. A 
firm entering the market with a relatively higher network externality than his rival is found to 
dominate the market in equilibrium. However, due to product differentiation (branding) and 
heterogeneous consumers, both firms can exist in the market. The dominant firm with the 
greater network externality will charge a higher price and spend more on advertising.  
                                                 
16
 Please refer to Appendices A (ii) for stability condition proofs. 
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3.4 DISCUSSION 
The gaming industry was reported to be worth almost $80 billion in 2012, according to a 
recent report in The Economist (2013). This figure combines the revenue from devices, 
software and gaming revenue. Microsoft and Sony are now in the midst of another console 
war with their respective products, Xbox One and Playstation 4, both due for release in the 
run up to the holiday season this year.  Network externalities are important for the gaming 
industry as gamers interact with each other through online gaming networks. The gaming 
consoles are launched simultaneously and the majority of gamers decide on one game 
console to purchase. Strategic advertising and price competition are fierce during the launch 
of these products.  
In the introduction, I mentioned the console war launched between Microsoft and Sony in 
2005.  In this section, I will apply product information and statistics from their respective 
products, Xbox 360 and Playstation 3, to analyse this system war further. I have chosen to 
examine this industry because most of the information and statistics of importance are 
available in some form. However, these products are available worldwide, competing in 
many different markets which have evolved considerably over the period from 2005 to the 
present day. My focus is on the sales of their hardware, i.e. console devices, but inevitably 
firms in this industry are also concerned with the complementary market of gaming software. 
The decision for gamers about which gaming console to purchase involves expectations about 
which console will be more heavily purchased in addition to the relative prices and qualities 
of the rival firms’ products. These expectations are due to the fact that a higher number of 
purchases of a given console translate directly into an increase in the number of competitors 
on the online network, social interaction, troubleshooting knowledge base, availability of 
games, and complementary products, for the gamer.  
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There is little difference between the qualities of the hardware of these consoles. Games 
exclusive to one console are available and some games are available across both consoles. 
What is important for the application of this model is that in order for network users to play 
each other using an online network, even with a game available to both, they must own the 
same console. The Xbox 360 console and its online multiplayer gaming and digital media 
service Xbox Live operated by Microsoft boosted the largest, most active online community 
of friends, family and rivals worldwide after its launch in 2007.
17
 It is still reported to have 
the largest online community which presents a more “hardcore” experience for online 
gamers.
18
 These benefits offer each Xbox 360 console buyer an increased marginal benefit 
from joining this network over the alternative provided by Playstation, namely, Playstation 
Network.  
 
 
 
 
Sony Playstation 3 
 
 
Microsoft Xbox 360 
Advertising $150 million $945 million 
Price $249 + free online service $299 + $60 yearly online subscription 
Market Share  73.8 million units 74.9 million units 
Profits 
 
-4.951 billion -2.996 billion 
 
When examining the advertising revenue of the rival companies during the launch of these 
products it is clear that Microsoft’s advertising budget was much greater than Sony’s. Ad age 
reports that Jeff Bell, Microsoft’s Xbox Marketing head, had an advertising budget of $945 
million during this period.
19
 Meanwhile Sony was reported to be spending $150 million on 
their ad campaign during the launch of the Playstation 3.
20
 This large difference can be 
observed as a trend over time. In 2010, when Microsoft launched the Xbox Kinect, a gaming 
                                                 
17 http://live.vgcore.com/news/2174.html 
18 http://games.ninemsn.com.au/news/ps3-vs-xbox-360-who-wins 
19 http://www.joystiq.com/2006/11/12/jeff-bell-has-945mm-to-spend-marketing-the-xbox-and-zune 
20 http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/11/13/8393083/ 
Table 3.1: Case study statistics relating to the console system war 
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system that combines a hands free controller with the Xbox 360 console, they launched a 
$500 million marketing campaign. 
21
 In a similar product launch in 2009, Sony is reported to 
have spent £82 million ($132 million) on a marketing campaign during the release of the PS3 
slim gaming console.
22
 In viewing their relative advertising expenditure during 2012, a period 
where both firms were winding down their current products, Microsoft spent $62.2 million 
and Sony spent $53.6 million on media advertising.
23
 Furthermore, to highlight this 
difference in spending on advertising, Sony in 2010 admitted that it will never be able, or 
perhaps want, to spend the same amount on promoting the Playstation as Microsoft does on 
the Xbox.
24
 
Sony originally launched with a higher price but quickly dropped its price. Its approach to the 
pricing of the next generation PS4, due to launch this year, is also reported to be lower than 
the Xbox One, $400 compared to $500.
25
 Considering the yearly subscription of $59.99 per 
year to access Xbox Live, Microsoft’s console users have a higher price to pay. The 
Playstation Network has no associated charge for players. At the end of 2012, the market 
shares were very close with global sales of Xbox 360 reaching 74.9 million units and 
Playstation 3 reaching 73.8 million units. 
26
 These figures show that Microsoft has continued 
to hold the lead with a greater market share over the seven-year period from 2006 to 2013. 
However, both firms are significant players in the gaming market and the market share is 
very close with Playstation gaining significant ground. 
The consoles are sold at a loss due to the profits made from the sales of the complementary 
games software. Despite sales of over 70 million consoles each, Ben Cousins, a former EA 
and Sony employee, reports that the consoles have cost the companies collectively over $8 
                                                 
21http://www.informationweek.com/smb/mobile/xbox-kinect-to-appear-on-oprah-ellen/227900162?cid=RSSfeed_IWK_All 
22 http://www.itproportal.com/2009/08/25/sony-spend-82m-ps3-european-campaign/ 
23 http://adage.com/article/digital/xbox-playstation-prep-bruising-ad-spending-battle/242141/ 
24 http://www.computerandvideogames.com/263948/sony-we-cant-compete-with-xboxs-spending/ 
25 http://fansided.com/2013/08/06/which-company-will-win-the-next-gen-console-wars-xbox-one-vs-ps4/ 
26 http://www.vgchartz.com/yearly/2012/Global/ 
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billion in losses.
27
 Citing financial reports of the companies, Cousins’ report states that 
Microsoft has spent close to $3 billion on Xbox 360 while Sony has fared worse, spending 
close to $5 billion on Playstation 3. Therefore, when considering their relative profits relating 
to the consoles Microsoft’s profit is greater.  
The outcome of my model predicts that the dominant firm with the greater network 
externality will optimally spend more on advertising, charge a higher price, gain a greater 
market share and ultimately have higher profits in equilibrium. This analysis, using evidence 
from the market for gaming consoles, highlights the role of network externalities and a 
‘Matthew effect’ in equilibrium outcomes. I expect that an examination of products in the 
area of computer software, mobile networks, smartphones, tablet computers, computer 
operating systems and/or applications, social networking sites, websites (Ebay, Google, Wiki, 
etc), credit cards, electric cars, pharmaceutical drugs, music players, and video recorders, 
may show further evidence of the role of differences across network externalities. Moreover, 
the type of products in markets with network externalities are ever increasing due to the 
growth of network effects and the increased ease of social interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 http://www.gamefront.com/the-ps3-and-xbox-360-have-made-huge-losses-up-to-8-billion/ 
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I presented a Hotelling model investigating two firms, producing different 
varieties of a good, competing in a market with persuasive advertising and network 
externalities. Strategic interactions in advertising and pricing were analysed. A benchmark 
case where firms’ network externalities are symmetric provided a case for comparison. This 
model is a first attempt to focus on how firms’ relative network externalities affect price and 
advertising competition in a duopoly setting.  
First, I found that given symmetry and advertising expenditures, network externalities 
intensify price competition with equilibrium prices falling as network effects become more 
significant. Second, with asymmetric network externalities, if the consumer’s disutility or 
distaste associated with purchasing a brand different from his ideal brand (travel costs) are 
not ‘too’ low, both firms will exist in the market. The findings provide support for a 
“Matthew Effect” where the firm’s initial advantage due to its higher network externality 
accumulates further advantage through the advertising and pricing stages. The firm with the 
greater network externality is found to dominate the market. This dominant firm will be 
observed with a higher advertising expenditure, price, profits and market share relative to the 
rival firm.  
The approach remains partial in many respects. The model is linear in transportation costs, 
differences in network externalities are exogenous and the market size is fixed. Further 
research to endogenise network externalities and investigate the results in a more general 
model would test the robustness of my results.  
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3.7 APPENDIX 
A. The Stability of the Equilibrium  
i. Pricing  
This proof shows that the Nash pricing equilibrium presented in the symmetric case is stable. 
The corollary used is taken from Vives (2001): Consider a two-player game with one-
dimensional strategy spaces. If set of strategies (  ,     is a regular Nash equilibrium, then it 
is locally stable if at (  ,       
                           
    
   
   
    
   
         
    
      
  
    
      
                                                
The profit maximisation functions are given in equation (7) and (8). Using equation (27), 
computing second order conditions and cross derivatives, the following result is obtained: 
                          
  
       
  
  
       
         
 
       
  
 
       
                                        
 
 
          
      
 
          
                                                         
The inequality is strictly satisfied.  
□ 
 
ii. Advertising   
This proof shows that the Nash advertising equilibrium presented is (locally) stable if and 
only if   
 
  
 
       
 
     The profit maximisation functions are given in equation (7) and (8). 
Using equation (27), computing second order conditions and cross derivatives, the following 
result is obtained: 
                                  
                   
               
 
 
        
  
               
 
 
                                          
                                                                             
The inequality is satisfied if and only if    
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